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A model of the ASOP decision process within the Office of the
Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations is formulated. This
decision deals with the aggregated force level estimates for the ASOP.
The variables of the model are the informational sources which are
utilized in forminn the estimate for the ASOP. The Planning, Programming
and Budgeting System requires annual submission of the Army's estimate
of forces needed to meet strategic objectives. The background for the
ASOP estimate is presented. A closer examination of the environment
which prevails at ODCSOPS is then examined. The model is then described
with a justification for selecting and quantifying the model's variable.
A statistical technique was suggested to demonstrate possible insights
which could be obtained from the model. The validity of the model is
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This thesis proposes a decision model for the process which annually
estimates the land forces needed to fulfill the Army's worldwide commit-
ments. The model describes the interactions of relevant factors which
influence the estimate of land forces in the Army's Strategic Objective
Plan (ASOP). On the Army Staff, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military
Operations (DCSOPS) has the responsibility of preparing the force estimates
for the ASOP, the Army's mid-range planning document in the annual Planning,
Programminq, and Budget System's (PPRS) cycles. Planning information is
received from:
1) The President and National Security Council in terms of
strategic guidance
2) The Department of Defense force planning agencies, chiefly
AOSDSA
3) The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)
4) The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)
5) Intelligence aaencies who provide threat analvsis
6) Other Army Staff Sections and Commands
The scooe of this thesis is limited to examining the aggregated
force requirements exnressed in Army division force equivalents' which
are reguested in the ASOP. The staff recommendation for the ASOP force
'The division force enuivalent (DFE) or average force size
approximates 48,000 men, with roughly equal 16,000 men increments:
the division itself; the initial supporting increment ( 1 S I ) required
for the initial staaes of combat; and the sustaining support increment
(SSI) required for sustained combat beyond 60 days. The DFE is the
basic unit of measurement for the decision model.

level decisior which DCSOPS prepares for the Army's chain of command
is the subject which this thesis examines. This recommendation will be
referred to as the "ASOP estimate" throughout this presentation. In
developing the decision model for the process that yields this estimate,
a review of the backqround of the estimate and its environment is necessary,
The approach taken is to place the ASOP in the framework of the defense
planning effort and then examine how the ASOP estimate is used in estab-
lishing Army force levels. The current Army approach in determining the
ASOP estimate is then contrasted with an alternate approach to force
planning.
The proposed decision model describes the current procedures which
DCSOPS utilizes in the estimation process. Using the decision model and
evaluating the contributions of the variables in the model's equation,
it is possible to reconstruct the ASOP estimate and determine the trends
in the ASOP decision. For example, an increased reliance on automated
force planning systems, such as FOREWON, could be identified using
techniques such as regression analysis. If these trends are identified
and the contributions of the variables quantified, the model would prove
useful in justifying the proportion of planning effort, both in time and
money, that should be affixed to each of the ASOP information sources.
For example, if the model indicated a constant 70% contribution for
FOREWON in the ASOP estimate, this would imnly that at least a similar
percentage of planning time and money should be devoted to improving
and refining the FOREWON results. The validity of the model is addressed
in the concluding chapter of this thesis. Although some of the material
presented relates to previous approaches to the force planning problem,




1 1 . BACKGROUND
This section develops the general framework of defense management
in which the ASOP is produced. The management system which is discussed
is commonly called the PPBS. The PPBS's impact on Army force planning
can be shown by the preparation of the ASOP and the corresponding analysis
A definition of the key Army planning activities precedes an explanation
of the Army's role in the PPBS.
The United States Army continually plans for the future. One step
in that plannina is the determination of the required future size of the
Army, given a statement of the contingent missions it may be called on
to perform. The word "required" is a difficult word to define in the
context of force planning. What is considered "required" by one planning
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of national goals differs. This points out a need for defining the terms
in the plannina process.
According to Colonel John R. Brinkerhoff in his review of force
planning in the Department of Defensetl] there are four force structures
in the planning environment:
1. The Objective Force
2. The Approved Force
3. The Authorized Force
4. The Actual Force
Colonel Brinkerhoff calls on his seven year working level experience in
the force planning field to explain the complexities of force planning
by establishing "user oriented" definitions for the planning terms. This
aDnroach is appropriate for this discussion since the p oposed decision
model relatos to the working level withir DCSOPS.

The force structures are best defined by their relationship with
the resources which comprise the force. The Objective Force is the set
of desired resources. The Approved Force is the set of required resources
to establish the envisioned force. The Authorized Force is the set of
funded resources. The Actual Force is the set of presently existing
resources. There is a definite difference between the Objective Force
and the Approved Force. The Approved Force establishes the military
resource level which, in the judgment of the Secretary of Defense, is
necessary to assure that national objectives are met. The Objective
Force is the product of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Services
estimates of what force levels are necessary for the accomplishment of
the national objectives.






Their relationships are shown in Figure 1.
The scope of this thesis is restricted to examining the force
estimation orocess. Force estimation is accomplished by the Office of
the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and by each
respective Service. The product of the Services and JCS effort is the
objective force and is published annually in the Joint Strategic Objective
Plan (JSOP). OSD estimates forces annually to establish a basis for
reviewing the JCS and Services estimates. They establish a DoD position













Figure 1. Force Relationships

support of this position, each Service prepares their own estimates of
the force levels necessary to accomplish their missions. Necessary, as
used above, implies a justified need, which may or may not exist,
depending on the viewpoint of the planner analyzing the mission.
The Army's mid-range estimate in the JSOP is the Army Strategic
Objective Plan (ASOP). This plan reflects the Army's view on strategy
and fcrce levels of their own and the other Services in the accomplish-
ment of the stated national objectives. The ASOP describes more than an
aggregated force level for a particular strategy. It is published in
two volumes, the first volume translating national and joint military
policy, objectives, and strategy into specific Army strategy for guidance
in the preparation of alternative Army objective forces and resource
requirements that are presented in the second volume. These alternatives
donict tihr .^re.^s of deolovrnsnt* the composition of the fo^ce^ in^'n l x/pi d
and other descriptive factors such as assumptions used and cost data. The
snecific item of the objective force which will be examined is the total
force required measured in divisions.
To better understand how the ASOP fits into the overall defense
planning effort, it is helpful to review the PPBS which former Secretary
of Defense, Robert S. PcNamara initiated in 1961. E 2] When Mr. McNamara
assumed the duties of Secretary of Defense in 1961, he soon found a
separation of military planning and budgeting that resulted in lack of
coordination and cooperation. ^ J
Planning, the responsibility of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the
military departments, was accomplished in terms of military forces and
weapons systems. This planning horizon extended over periods of from
five to ten years. Budgeting, however, was done for only one year and
in terms of functional catenories such as military personnel, operations
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and maintenance, procurement, research, development, test and evaluation,
and military construction. The budgeting operation was done by the
civilian secretary and the comptroller organization. Although there
was ample planning efforts in both the military and short range fiscal
areas, a separation existed which cost the taxpayers millions of dollars
each year due to the inefficient management techniques employed in the
Department of Defense (DoD).L3J
Secretary McNamara turned to Charles J. Hitch, the DoD's Comptroller
at the time and now recognized as a leading authority on program budgeting
[2]
and the application of economic analysis to defense problems. Dr.
Hitch introduced two techniques, programming and systems analysis, to
improve high-level planning in DoD. As Dr. Hitch stated after leaving DoD:
"We introduced programming to make the military planning
of the Deoartment realistic, to make it face uo to the
hard choices by linking it to fiscal planning from which
it had been entirely divorced, and we introduced systems
analysis to provide a criterion or standard for making
those hard choices, to achieve some rationality and
optional ity in the planning. "[4]
The program which Mr. McNamara initiated was a combination of management
techniques and was referred to as PPBS. PPBS was founded on six basic ideas
1. Develop explicit criterion as measures of the need for and
adequacy of defense programs
2. Associated fiscal estimates with the respective military requests
3. Provide feasible alternatives to decisions at the highest level
in the decision process.
4. Active use of an analytical staff to provide inDut into the
decision-making process.




6. Explicit and open analysis to provide credibility and awareness
of the basis for military decisions.
The PPBS, established in 1961, is still in being. It is developed
on the concept of centralized planning where national security objectives
are related to strategy, strategy then matched with forces, forces then
linked with resources, and resources with costs. 1- J The planning horizons
have been defined to be either short-range, mid-range, or long-range. In
this context, the ASOP represents the Army's estimate cf necessary forces
to accomplish their missions in the mid-range period, from five to ten
years in the future.
The current Secretary of Defense, Mr. Helvin Laird, has decentralized
the olanning effort, shiftinn the burden from OSD to the Services. The
ASOP has taken on greater importance by this shift. Mr. Laird has given
the Services more authority in the PPBS cvcle by makinci them conduct
their own analysis on plans and programs while utilizing the management
technioues introduced by Mr. McNamara. The Services have not reverted
back to the old procedure of separating fiscal planning from the military
planning of weapons sy terns and force levels. They are now required to
make the "hard choice" as Dr. Hitch said, in reference to the selection
and development of programs. The ASOP must consequently translate the
national objectives and policies from the President into feasible military
objectives which the Army can accomplish within the confined environment
of fiscal and military constraints.
The ASOP is a document that has far reaching implications both at
home and abroad. It provides a basis for planning military assistance
to the Free World countries and for the development and review of
12

interallied plans. L -I If the perceived threat in one theater exceeds
the ability of the Army to counter such a threat, the allies must be
encouraged to provide greater support for the accomplishment of the
strategic goal
.
Now that the background of the Army's ASOP estimate has been
examined, the environment in which the estimate is prepared will be
discussed. This environment includes those factors which can be
identified as having an effect on the preparation of the ASOP estimate.
Sources of information, management techniques, time and money constraints,
and use of computers are a few of the factors which influence the estimate
and which will be discussed in the next section.
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III. ENVIRONMENT OF THE ASOP ESTIMAT E
The objective of this section is to present the method which the
Army currently employs in the estimation process. Appropriate data
and analyses must be selected from a number of information sources to
construct a credible and workable estimate of the Army's force require-
ments. This section traces that selection process which yields the
estimate by examining the environment which prevails at DCSOPS. The
Army's approach to the problem incorporates the extensive use of
automated planning systems. One particular planning system, FOREWON,
is described and its utility to the planning effort is shown by an
example of how it is used in DCSOPS.
A. DATA COLLECTION FOR ASOP
Although other staff agencies orovide varying degrees of information
for the ASOP, DCSOPS processes, evaluates, and selects the appropriate
information for the preparation of the estimate. Other agencies are
not required to provide complete ASOP estimates but rather produce
estimates of particular problem areas with their associated analysis.
Each of these agencies supplies information to substantiate the Army's
view en the appropriate level of ground combat forces required to meet
perceived contingencies.
It should be noted that in the present sequence of events, the
preparation of the ASOP from the numerous inputs precedes the issuance
of fiscal and logistical guidance from the Office of the Secretary of
Defense. The estimate being prepared by DCSOPS is thus unconstrained
by fiscal limitations, although anticipation of the fo, Incoming budget
constraints tempers the estimate.
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The initial estimating effort proceeds with a theater by theater
determination of the threat. The sources of the threat analysis provide
both general and specific interpretations of possible contingencies.
Many agencies provide threat analysis for the ASOP estimate. The composite
analysis is derived in DCSOPS after receiving the threat appraisals from
the numerous sources. DoD planning guidance contains a major portion of
the threat analysis in the form of the scenarios which the Services are
asked to address in their planning. The past ASOP estimate is a good
reference since previous threat considerations should be a valid source
for the 5-10 year time frame which must be examined. Supporting intelli-
gence studies are used when the threat envisioned in last year's ASOP has
appreciably changed and needs updating.
Once the threats are identified to the satisfaction of the force
r»1pnpr»v*r -i r> nPCODC 4-kp fn^roc ponin* v^aA +0 romKat "hho fhr-Qaf mnc t hot'iuiiiic L/UJUr o 3 i-ii> 1 \j 1 \,*z -» i*-n.*v<ii*~^4 oj v,ui.i.yu i» l*i 1 w uii Cut ...^«j^ -^^.
determined. This step in the planning process entails an interpretation
of U.S. military objectives in the respective theater. Knowledge of
fiscal constraints is also necessary to determine how much troop and
monetary augmentation will be needed from our Allies to support the
Army's contingency missions. If the Army feels a certain troop level
must be maintained in a given theater, a reduction in U.S. troop strength
necessitates an increase in our Allies troop strength to balance U.S.
losses.
There are dangers in translating these objectives into the actual
force level that should be established. First, the strategic guidance
which is received in support of the defense planning effort seldom appears
in the form of space, time, and resources to be used. The terms such
15

as "successfully defend" or "successfully counterattack" require trans-
lation into definitive statements which can be used to generate actual
requirements. The vague nature of defend or counterattack provides
wide ranges of estimates depending on the interpretation which the planner
utilizes in his calculations of how many forces are required to accomplish
the mission. The number of forces required to successfully defend forward
of the Rhine River for 15 days in Germany are much different from the
number necessary to defend the same terrain for 45 days under the same
conditions. The interpretation of strategic guidance therefore presents
a significant problem for force planners. It should be noted however
that recent trends have shown that DoD scenarios are becoming more precise
with regard to time and location.
A second danger in translating guidance into concrete factors for
planning is the d^rifipy* of croatino a limited number of scenarios with
which to analyze the requirements. Force planning agencies outside the
Army, such as OASD(SA), question the credibility of strongly scenario-
dependent ASOP estimates. Without explicit time and space definitions
of strategic missions, the Army converts national military objectives
into scenarios which attempt to fit the general guidance to specific
situations. This attempt reflects the Army's view of threat and strategy.
Planners in OSD view the same situation differently because they must
consider the entire military situation not just the Army's part in the
strategy. Recently the Army's view on necessary force levels have exceeded
OSD's and Congress's willingness to support them since the Army has not
treated their strategic position as part of the overall armed forces struc-
ture. Each service sees its role in national defense differently than the
other services see the respective roles. The Army has i ^ver recommended .°
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Navy force to do the tasks it believes are inherently Army-oriented
such as provide helicopter mobile security forces for the LOC traffic
which utilizes inland waterways in Vietnam. The Navy, on the other
hand, might view the security of shins using inland waterways as a
natural extension of their role to protect shipping in the combat zone.
The Navy might assign these missions to the Marines while the Army con-
siders the mission theirs and thus two (even three) Services plan for
one mission. The same analogy might be extended to larger missions and
into the strategic tasks for specific theaters. The planning conflicts
of multiple service interpretation of strategic guidance adds another
dimension to the problem of force planning.
B. THE ARMY'S APPROACH TO PLANNING
The environment of the ASOP estimate in DCSOPS is characterized by
short deadlines. Whether internally or externally generated, the demands
for available time hinder a comprehensive and exhaustive ASOP preparation.
Past studies, requests from theater CinC's, war game analysis, and
"military judgment" provide the bulk of references for the ASOP estimate.
Time and money constraints have made it difficult to direct numerous
studies to investigate the implications of various fores planning policies
on ASOP estimates. Contract agencies support the DCSOPS effort in looking
at the required force levels in various situations; however, their results
generally lack the impact of independent analysis, since they usually are
specifically tasked to support the Army's view.
In an effort to shorten the preparation time associated with the
ASOP estimate, the Army is relying on the extensive use of combat simula-
tions to substantiate their estimates. Due to this reliance on simulate ns
and war games, the Army's approach to force planning is characterized
17

as the dynamic approach. In this context, the dynamic approach relates
to the interactions of combat elements as they simulate a combat opera-
tion. The dynamic approach is favored by the Army because it yields
planning benefits which they believe cannot be gained by a static
tabulation or inventory-type approach. The static tabulation approach,
commonly referred to as the static approach, is characterized by a
listing of quantities of forces and weapons sytems and the resultant
ratios which are formed using these quantitative lists. The ratios
appear in various forms depending upon the questions to which the analysis
is directed. Such ratios as friendly tanks to enemy tanks, friendly
anti-tank weapons to friendly infantry troops, and enemy aircraft to
friendly anti-aircraft missiles are a few of the ratios that might be
used in the static approach.
One advantage of the dynamic approach relative to the static
approach is gained in the process of programming a dynamic simulation.
Many unquantifiable planning factors which are important are considered
that the counting approach neglects. For example, many of the parameters
and variables of combat can be analyzed in a realistic space and time
setting. Parameters are defined here to be a rate or ratio whose value
may vary with the circumstances of its application, such as advance
rates, casualty rates, and resupply rates. Variables, on the other hand,
are referred to in this discussion as inputs which appear as numerical
quantities of troops, weapons, and equipment and depends only on forces
available, strategy, tactics, and political situations.
C. ATLAS WAR GAME
An example of parameters and innuts in a realistic space and time
setting is found in theater level combat simulation, ATLAS. ATLAS can
18

be programmed to represent land combat on the European Continent in
the time frame of 1973. Parameters such as advance rates and replace-
ment rates can be established in order to analyze the results of, for
example, increasing the inputs, initial friendly troop strerigths, by
10%.
The documentation and user's guide to ATLAS by RACL'J contains a
complete description of the theater model. To summarize that description,
ATLAS is comprised of four separate assessment models:
(1) The Ground Combat Model
(2) The Logistics Model
(3) The Tactical Air Model
(4) The Tactical Decision Model
The ground combat model's primary function is to make a daily
determination of chance of the FEBA in each combat sector. It accom-
plishes this be determining the force ratios, the comparative ratios of
combat effectiveness, and the postures of the engaged troops and conse-
quently establishing the rate of advance of the attacker. The force
ratio depends upon artillery, tactical air support, casualties sustained,
and the status of supply. Reserves are accepted and entered into combat
after they are moved forward by the logistics model. Ineffective
divisions due to casualties are removed from combat and withheld long
enough to be restored to combat effectiveness before they are returned
to combat. These actions are performed in accordance with the values
assigned for the parameters, such as supply rates, performance-posture
levels, and casualty rates.
The logistics model simulates in a highly aggregated manner the
flow of units and supplies in each combat sector from t ? port of
debarkation, through the intermediate points, finally to the forward
19

supply point. Enemy interdiction of the LOC causes loss of supplies
and/or the capacity to continue supply operations. Shortage of supplies
results in degradation of combat effectiveness. Although the logistic
model ignores many of the complexities of supply, it does measure the
capability of LOC to move essential tonnages from the port of entry to
the combat divisions.
The air model simulates the use of tactical aircraft and enemy
air defenses in the combat theater. Five types of missions are
considered: (1) surface-to-air missile suppression, (2) supply inter-
diction, (3) air base interdiction, (4) close-air support, and (5) air
defense. Transport aircraft are simulated by allowing the movement of
supplies by air in terms of total tons of supplies between locations
within each sector.
Finally, the tactical decision model allocates resources of men
and material within the theater according to sector needs and capability
to support additional units. Daily allocation of tactical aircraft
depends on the type of ground action, oonosing air force ratios, air-
craft availability, and the status of the air battle. The aggressor's
rate of advance or cumulative advance toward some strategic objective
determines the assignment of new arrived combat units. Most other units
are placed in sectors according to their prescribed tactical doctrine,
for example, SAM units. A general summary is shown in Figure 2.
There can be many distinct data values employed in ATLAS. A
recent application in a Southeast Asian theater required almost 1000 data
values to describe the situation of the two forces. 1 7 -> There are over
100 parametric inputs that can be used singularly or in combinations
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tactical air and logistical resources
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immediate interpretations of situation
(perhaps return to PREGAME PREPARATION)
RESULTS
complete analysis
* This analysis includes a comprehensive review of all inputs,
parameters, and objectives. The run might be repeated several times
in order to achieve satisfactory results. Throughout the above steps
there is an implied recycle capability to ensure credible outputs from
each previous step.
Figure 2. Summary of Atlas Run
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shown in [7], which can be manipulated are given in Table 1. These
parameters can be manipulated by system operators in order to produce
desired military and strategic objectives. Often the alteration of but
a few parameters, such as mobilization and resupply rates, could change
the movement of the FEBA and hence change the combat situation.
D. THE FOREWON SYSTEM
There are other questions which can be answered by the dynamic
approach that cannot be derived from an analysis of quantitative listings:
1. The effect of alternative assumptions about the timing of
mobilization and deployment in relation to the actual outbreak
of hostilities ,although timed static comparisons can be made.
2. The effects on the progress of battle of possible alternative
deployments of available troops.
3. The relationship of troop units to operatinq space along the
battlefront and in depth throughout the area of operations.
The number of trooos might not be as critical as their dis-
placement within the combat area.
4. The effects of friendly ground lost or gained as it may
affect the capabilities of friendly supply and communications
lines (LOC).
5. The effects of interdiction campaigns on friendly forces and
LOCs.
6. The assessment of assumptions of reasonable variability in
r oi
the estimated quality and endurance of opposed combat forces. 1 ° J
Although the dynamic approach is viewed by some planning agencies
as a "black box" approach, it tends to uncover missed details in new concepts
or tactical missions that have never previously been 3 alyzed. In its














number of days ATLAS is to be
played
number of combat units committed to
battle on the 1st day
gross ICE value for committed unit
(Index of Combat Effectiveness)
percentage of an active unit's TOE
strength that is replaced each day
minimum percentage of effective
combat unit ICE by sector that
should be held in reserve
replacement rate for uncommitted
units
attrition to attack aircraft
from ADA weapons assumed to be
available to supply convoys
day on which replacements begin
entering the combat units under
non-linear replacement policy
number of days of a "planned day
of supply" that each unit tries
to keep on hand
attrition constant to the fixed-
wing transport capability cost
because of tactical air interdiction
Table 1. Sample of ATLAS Parameters
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automated force planning system, FOREWON. FOREWON consists of five
computerized models which allow planners the capability to evaluate
force/cost packages so that alternative objective forces are related
to their associated costs. FOREWON can accept a wide range of scenarios
which reflect the threat analyses and, based on parametric values and
given inputs, produces a single objective force. The four major models
are:
1. Preliminary Force Designer
2. Objective Force Designer
3. Theater Force Designer
4. Force Cost Accessor
In a typical FOREWON run by DCSOPS, the Preliminary Force Designer
operates first. It accomplishes what its name implies; it designs, in a
very aggreqated fashion, the entire objective force. It utilizes the
given values of major variables, such as reserve composition, readiness
conditions of units and deployment schedules to deliver divisions which
meet the objectives stated for each theater of operation. It utilizes
linear programming technique to accomplish its purpose at the least
cost and with the most efficient use of inter-theater lift.
While the Preliminary Force Designer addresses all of the theaters
simultaneously, the Theater Force Designer structures each of the theater
forces one at a time on a much more detailed basis. It consists of the
war aaminn model, ATLAS, which displays the movement of the FEBA on a
daily basis and a force structuring model, FASTALS, which develops a
theater troop list.
Upon completion of all the FASTALS runs, the troco lists are
collected by the Objective Force Designer. This model combines them
24

to develop an overall force which is capable, according to Army inter-
pretation, of handling the situation which it has considered. After
the Objective Force is determined, the Force Cost Assessor then costs
the force. It computes the operating costs of the forces at the
beginning of the planning period, the operating costs of the objective
force, and the cost of changing from the present force to the objective
force.
All of the computer models are being operated under the control
of the Army Staff. DCSOPS is charged with responsibility for the
overall system operation; ACSFOR is responsible for FASTALS, and the
Comptroller is responsible for the Force Cost Assessor. The remaining
models are run for DCSOPS by STAG. The first complete exercise in
1970 utilizing FGREWON took about three months , however subsequent runs
have reduced the time considerably. Sensitivity analysis is performed
quickly on F0REW0N. For example, NSSM-84 expanded the scenarios that
had to be examined. L ™ As a result, JCS requested the Army to develop
force requirements for 21 different scenarios which it was able to do
in one week. The big advantage of FOREh'ON is its capability to
quickly offer insights into decision makers' "what if" questions.
E. SAMPLE F0REW0N EXERCISE
In order to highlight how F0REW0N is used in DCSOPS, a sample run
of the entire system gives an example of the utility of the automated
force planning system to the force planner. The example describes a
typical F0REW0N exercise and the resulting analysis that must be
performed to derive meaningful results from the computer outputs.
These outputs are the alternate objective forces which are described
25

by the necessary forces, peacetime stations, lift systems, costs,
mission performance, and the key assumptions with the planning para-
meters. As was mentioned earlier, only the force level expressed in
division size units are examined in the proposed decision model, however,
these are not the only results provided by FOREWON.
The Preliminary Force Designer generates a closure schedule of
divisions, ISIs and SSIs for each of the theaters of operations. A
normal delay in closure of 60 days is applied to the SSIs in order to
reduce the work loads for inter-theater lift and force readiness factors
of reserves. Given the schedule, ATLAS determines the FEBA position
throughout the war on a daily basis. Normally, several runs must be
made to assure the ATLAS results are consistent with "sound military
results." This asDect of the FOREWON is examined in the concluding
sections 01 onii. cnesis.
At this point, if the military objectives are not achieved, the
planners must go back to the Preliminary Force Designer and either change
the closure times in the model or -request additional lift in order to
get more divisions to the theater faster. Assuming the FEBA is satis-
factory, FASTALS is then operated to develop a set of time-phased troop
lists. A separate troop list for each of ten time periods which have
previously been defined is generated.
At this point, the planners check to see if the tonnages and troop
strength of FASTALS are compatible with the tonnages and strengths in the
Preliminary Force Designer output. A frequently encountered problem
is that the FASTALS outout is greater than that of the Preliminary Force
Desiqner in the early time periods. If this happens, the planners must
increase lag times in FASTALS for various administrative nd support
26

type elements in order to decrease the deployment time of combat units
or specify more lift.
When the support units have been delayed as long as practical,
the problem of reducing the movement tonnages by changing the combat
force must be answered. If units such as artillery are delayed, the
simulated war might be adversely affected and result in starting the
FOREWON run again from the beginning. It may, however, be possible to
reduce the intensity of the war and still achieve the military objective.
In some cases, the objective itself might be altered to achieve meaningful
results. This alteration not only includes planning manipulation but
also tactical considerations as how to best accomplish the objective.
When FOREWON results have satisfied the planners at this stage of
the run, the objective force is then computed on the basis of providing
the required forces for each theater troop list, being certain to check
to see if the combined force exceeds ''reasonable' 1 limits. Allocation rules
in FASTALS must be changed if the forces designated for each theater
troop list total a combined force that is excessive in terms of actual
and projected resources. If the FASTALS allocation rules are changed,
the entire system must again be analyzed to determine the effect of a
new allocation schedule. If the combined force is acceptable to the
planners, the Force Cost Assessor costs the objective force.
In the next section an alternative aDproach toward force planning
is examined. This asset counting approach is used in OSD and was
referred to as the "static approach" due to its reliance on the listing
of combat elements. This alternate approach is discussed in comparison
to the Army's approach. The advantages and disadvantages of the static
approach are also examined.
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IV. AN ALTERNATE APPROACH TO PLANNING
While the Army force planners rely on their "dynamic approach" to
force planning, there is another approach which is practiced in DoD.
This section discusses the approach which force planners in OSD utilize
to answer the same planning questions which face the Army although OSD
must address the entire military effort while the Army looks at their
role in the "big picture." OSD's approach is referred to as a "static
approach." OSD has recently shown more interest in the future of the
dynamic approach while still favoring the static approach at the present
time. The approach is static because it is based on a system which counts
assets as the basis for force estimation analysis. The discussion in-
cludes the advantages and disadvantages of the static approach, a
comparison with the "dynamic approach," and a theoretical example of how
potential for success or failure of a military campaign based on the
numbers of troops or weapons sytem and the subsequent comparisons against
evemy troops and weapons are difficult to solve. Certainly the comparisons
of two force strengths gives an indication as to how the battle should
go, however, the complexities of war negate such an uncomplicated solution
to the planning problem.
The purpose of static indicators is to provide insights into the
required force levels needed to achieve national objectives. They offer
some useful management information which OSD analysts use to derive
force potential. They can be used in a comparative analysis to determine
how they correspond to similar indicators of potential enemy forces.
They also provide a basis for year to year comparison of static indicators
of forces and weapon systems.
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The force planninn effort in OSD is centered in OASD(SA). Although
there appears to be future changes in 0ASD(SA)'s force planning endeavors,
the static approach is currently utilized to determine required force
level for all services, not just the Army. This static method incorporates
an analysis of so-called static measures of force capability. The four
general types are:
1. Inventories of manpower and major equipment items
2. Abstract measures of armament items (such as casualty
potential, firepower, effectiveness, etc.)
3. Operational characteristics of major weapons systems
4. Physical characteristics of major weapon systems
The Droblems encountered by appraising the force potential of
units by using static indicators are shown by force comparisons improving
or deteriorating over time, For example, this year's increase in the
number of anti-tank (AT) weapons systems in the airborne division compared
to the number of AT weapon systems of previous years gives an indication
of relative AT potential of the current division versus the past division's
potential. These comparisons or ratios are only significant as they
relate to themselves or other similar listings.
A shortcoming of this comparison of aggregated weapons is that it
assumes the same capabilities for all weapons in the aggregated total.
This could only be true if all weapons were the exact model with no
modifications. For example, it would be acceptable to total the fire-
power potential of the infantry's rifle if they all were M-16s. However,
it is inappropriate to state that each anti-tank weapon in the infantry
contributes the same caoabili ties . The infantry's light anti-tank weapon
(LAW) has much different characteristics and capabiliti than the
helicopter-t orne anti-tank systems.
29

A determination of effectiveness of troop level or weapon systems,
such as AT weapons, is more elusive to define since the interactions
of the systems must be considered. If war was fought on the basis of
tabulating troops and weapons and determining the winner based on the
highest number of assets, the static indicators would provide a fool-
proof answer to the question of "how much is enough?" Unfortunately,
wars are not waned in this manner.
To some analysts, the static approach has definite appeal. It
allows the analysts to present the decision makers with alternatives
which are based on quantifiable judgments. The Army's "black box"
approach seems to imply a mysterious treatment of combat variables
which often in the past has been manipulated to produce the desired
result. The static approach eliminates these variables such as weapon
systems interactions and interdiction, in its determination of required
force levels. The merit of the OSD's approach is that it allows open
presentation of force level analysis, that is, it justifies the results
with actual numbers without relying on manipulated assumptions to model
the combat situation.
OSD planners defend their static indicators approach on the basis
that the Army's system does not produce a valid enough estimate. This
problem of validity will be discussed in a later section. OSD planners
maintain that the computer simulations of combat have not reached the level
of sophistication that is necessary to produce worthwhile analytical
results. Since they do not believe that the FOREWON system and other
automated simulations presently have utility in force planning, they
use static indicators to gain insight in planning.
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There are many valid reasons to dispute the results of FOREWON
solely on the operation and interpretation of ATLAS. First, simulating
the conduct of battle is a highly complicated task since it entails
consideration of many factors that are not easily quantitatively defined.
Effectiveness in combat is an example of an abstract concept that must
be measured if conclusions are going to be made concerning comparative
relationships between friendly and enemy forces. Although much recent
study has been conducted by research groups, such as RAC, in modeling
land combat, past experience with these models has not led to complete
acceptance by the services and OSD. Some of the unacceptable aspects of
combat modeling are discussed in a subsequent section.
In addition to the treatment of war gaming in each of OSD's and
the Army approaches to force planning, a more basic difference exists
in their force planning methodology - the planning objective. While the
Army attempts to justify their needs based on their own plans and programs,
OSD must manaae the entire military program and mesh the biased services'
estimates with their own estimates in order to establish a force which
is acceptable to the President and Congress. OSD's planning is accom-
plished in light of strict budgetary and strategic guidance while the
Army is not bound by the same rigidity of constraints. The defense budget
may be divided many ways among the services and the Army attempts to
secure as large of portion of that budget as possible. DoD is going to
get a fixed percentage of the total budget and no more.
Analysts in OSD use the static indicators they believe give the best
insight into relatina military needs to national objectives. The force level
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estimates however require a subjective opinion on what indicators are
important and necessary to achieve the desired military result. The
decision makers are thus required to choose between alternatives in
force levels without an analysis of certain important aspects of land
combat. For example:
1. The kinematics of battle
2. The relative effects of interdiction on logistics capabilities
3. The effects of maneuver and redeployment alternatives
4. The effects of assumptions on mobilization
5. Parametric treatment of uncertain parameters such as movement
rates, terrain and weather, and firepower. Li Q|
Although the FOREWON system, specifically ATLAS, does not provide exact
answers to the above problems, it provides approximations of each aspect
to allow their respective analysis in viewing land combat.
Since the Army considers the analysis of force interactions important
in force planning, ODCSOPS initiated an informal study of the recent Arab -
Israeli War using OSD's static indicators to predict a winner in the conflict,
Usinq the static indicators, the result was an Arab victory - an incorrect
answer. To correct the obvious deficiencies pointed out by the ODCSOPS
study, OSD modified their indicators. 1- ^
The resultant indicators, called qualitative force indicators,
attempt to determine the military potential of a country by scoring a
certain number of points (0 to 100) for one or more qualitative measures
of combat capabilities. A list of qualitative force indicators is given
in Table 2. Using the new indicators the Arab-Israeli War was analyzed
again and this time an Israeli victory was predicted. The new, and
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seemingly correct answer, did not satisfy some critics of the static
approach.
RAC formulated a hypothetical conflict betv/een two fictitious
countries in order to demonstrate the deficiencies in the new qualita-
tive force indicators. The investigation showed that five of the
indicators listed in Table 2 (B,E,G,L,M) will give high scores to a side
based solely on the quality of the force, independent of the absolute
quantity of the force.
Although the reinforcement capability is discussed in this review
of RAC's example, the main point is that the emphasis placed on quality
over quantity is overbalanced in using the qualitative force indicators.
The proposed system of static indicators needs revision as the example
will show.
The score for any measure is computed by: (1) scorinq 100 points
for the side superior in that measure; and (2) scoring the inferior side
a number of points in proportion to the ratio of the value of its measure
to the superior side. Thus if the 60-day mobilization increment of one
side is 100,000 men and that of the other of two equal sides is 50,000
men, the superior side gets 100 points while the inferior side gets
50 points. The important point is the fact that it is based on a
percentage of the initial forces.
RAC showed that an extremely small, rich country which had a small,
but well equipped, active Army and a capability of rapidly mobilizing
a reserve force of equal strength could usually demonstrate a high
potential for combat according to OSD's revised indicators. In their
example, Minis tat, a country with a total population of 100 and a well
equipped Army of 15, demonstrated a greater combat potential than the
combined Arab strength as assigned to the other fictitious country.
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A. 60-day mobilization increment
B. 15-day mobilization increment
C. Active strength
D. Firepower score





J. 30-day land force reinforcement increment
K. Tanks + Arty + APC
L. Other Support Personnel/Cbt Support Personnel
M. (Tanks and APC)/Active Strength
N. Tactical Aircraft
Table 2. Representative Static Indicators
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Since both the Army's and OSD's methodologies have been discussed,
it is appropriate to observe how DCSOPS develops its ASOP estimate in
the light of the two conflicting approaches to force planning. The
proposed decision model for the ASOP estimate attempts to portray a
deliverately simplified picture of a complicated process in order to
gain insight into the ASOP preparation problem.
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V. PROPOSED DECISION MODEL
In model inq the decision process within ODCSOPS for the ASOP estimate,
four questions must be asked:
1. What factors are relevant to the ASOP decision?
2. Which of the above factors can be described numerically or
quantified?
3. How can the list of quantifiable factors be reduced by aggre-
gation and still contribute toward developing a better model.
4. What is the relationship between the elements and how can this
relationship be described analytically?!- J
The equations of the decision model represent the answers to these questions.
The factors which could be identified and subsequently defined in a functional
formula relates to the actual process by detailing the inputs used in its
foundation. This decision model is based on the author's evaluation of
ASOP planninq procedures, intuition on how various planning factors interact,
and approximations of numerous detailed processes that make up the decision
process.
Within ODCSOPS, the development of the force level estimates can be
traced from the multiple informational inputs, through the estimation process,
and finally to the ASOP decision which is submitted to the Army's chain of
command for integration into the JSOP. The entire process resembles that
much referenced "black box" into which information is fed and out of which
comes the force level estimate for the ASOP. It is this "black box" process
that the decision model attempts to describe. The intangible factors such
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as command influences, work-load factors in DCSOPS, and the technical
comoetency of the staff providing support to DCSOPS are not addressed.
Command influences included the tendencies of personnel in higher
staff positions outside the ODCSOPS to change or otherwise affect the
ASOP estimate. Technical competency of supporting personnel is con-
sidered to be constant for all ASOP estimates, that is, no estimating
process is adversely affected by the abilities of supporting sections.
Although the work loads within ODCSOPS vary from year to year, no predic-
tive scheme has been developed to anticipate how these factors affect the
ASOP estimate. The reason that these factors are not built into the model
is that they cannot be quantified from one ASOP to another. That is,
although some ASOP estimates might be influenced to a great degree by the
computer support available, an increase or decrease in the quality and
quantity of support does not significantly affect the process itself
and hence the decision model.
The model consists of two basic mathematical functions which com-
bine to yield the actual ASOP estimate which ODCSOPS submits to the Army
chain of command for aooroval and/or revision. In analytical form it states
(1) D(T) = o<-F +- p-d[F5,CR ,/*!,!?]
(2) of + £ = LO
where:
D(T): a scalar which represents the jth year ASOP estimate
expressed in units of DFE
o< : weighting factor attached to FOREWON results
F : FOREWON estimate of troop levels
6 : weighting factor attached to non-FOREWON estimate sources
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d[PS,CR,MJ,JP]: function of non-FOREWON estimates for the ASOP
estimate expressed in DFEs where:
PS: Past studies and previous ASOP estimates
CR: Command requirements as seen by theater CinCs
MJ: "Military Judgment" in the form of staff inter-
pretation of force requirements
JP: Combined planning estimates from joint 0SD?Army
effort
d[PS,CR,MJ,JP] might appear in various functional forms. For example:
d[PS,CR,MJ,JP] = [.8PS + .15CR + .9MJ + .2JP].25
.
or
d[PS,CR,MJ,JP] = [.5PS + .3JP] + JP • MJ
In each of the above hypothetical forms, the value of d[PS,CR,MJ,JP]
is the total DFEs needed for the ASOP estimate. The justification of the
impact of each of the function's variables is discussed later.
In order to understand how the model relates to the real world of
force planning, each element is discussed to show its relationship to the
model's final result - the DCSOPS's estimate.
The decision which leaves DCSOPS has been restricted in this dis-
cussion to be the force level estimates expressed in units of U.S. division
size elements. Although the structure of the U.S. Army division can vary,
the division unit here is comprised of nine maneuver battalions. For
example, D(72) is the ASOP estimate for the 1972 PPBS cycle. It is the
number of DFEs estimated to be required for the specified mid-range planning
horizons of the 1972 PPBS cycle. The actual ASOP presents alternative
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objective forces allocated for specific areas. The model is interested
solely in the determination of aggregated force levels displayed in DFEs.
The weighting factors, c<: and § , sum to 1.0 and thus represent
the proportion of emphasis (or reliability) placed on FOREWON results and
the non-FOREWON function, d[PS,CR,MJ,JP]. At present, the weighting
factors each appear at a positive level. Even if the FOREWON results could
be relied on to give accurate estimates of required force levels, the
composition of the active and inactive Army strengths reflects many units
that do not get treated in a FOREWON analysis. The DFEs used in FOREWON
comprise only one of three force categories in the Army. The categories
are:
1. The Division Force which comprise U.S. Army divisions and
command and support units that accompany them into combat
(DFEs included)
2. Special Mission Forces which are required for military missions
separate from those assigned to divisions (Special Forces is
an example)
3. General Support Forces which house, equip, and train the Army
(Basic Training Units, CONUS support)
The General Suoport Forces are not included in FOREWON analysis while
Special Mission Forces might be included. It is felt that there exists a
definite correlation between the size of the DFE and General Suoport Forces
necessary to suoport the DFEs. About 85% of the Army Reserves are programmed
in FOREWON because their composition is mainly combat or combat support
type units and are not basically CONUS support.
A high value of o< indicates a heavy weighting to FOREWON generated
force estimates. Ideally, the FOREWON system should give exact answers
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to the force planning problem but the state of the art in computer
simulations of land combat somewhat restricts the use of FOREWON results.
The combat assumptions necessary to make the ATLAS war game work in
FOREWON often oversimplify the complexities of land combat. The dilemna
of overcompli cation versus oversimplification in modeling comes to light
in the construction of the ATLAS war game, consequently, the results
must be analyzed with appreciation of this problem.
The next term in the model to examine is the FOREWON result, F.
The basic models of FOREWON have been previously described and their
use in DCSOPS planning effort has been shown. FOREWON not only provides
a strategy/force/cost proposal based on a specific set of inputs, it
offers the decision-makers the option of analyzing a group of alternative
structures based on different inputs. The ability to analyze a group of
alternative structures is certainly a benefit of the FOREWON. However,
this benefit has also been misused. Manipulation of various scenarios
offers force planners the capability to develop specific scenarios and
situations which support the Army's position. The resulting analysis on a
"manipulated" scenario lacks independent and meaningful interpretation.
Thus the ability to check a greater number of scenarios can be used to
produce an insensitive and invalid view of the interactions of combat
forces in the theater simulation, ATLAS. Although a worthwhile objective
of the Army's plannina effort is to view a greater number of scenarios,
this objective should be placed in the proper perspective. The same
criticism of the manipulated scenarios can be applied to the selection
of values for the parameters within the FOREWON system.
Continuing criticism of combat models, specifically ATLAS, appears
to be based on two major areas of war game construction, orm and parametric
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treatment of combat variables. There is a definite relationship between
these two areas since war game form often dictates the parameters,
however this discussion will treat both separately for clarity of
presentation. First, the form of the war game is usually a balance of
events and interactions which is not too complicated nor oversimplified.
A form which is too complicated often is cumbersome and not meaningful in
its interpretation. On the other hand, a war gaming form that neglects
many of the important combat interactions limits the scope of the game
and hence the credibility of the results. Somewhere between the too com-
plex and the oversimplified treatment of land combat is a form which is
mathematically tractable and representative of the combat which is to be
analyzed. Lenchester war games models are examples of the latter.
The parameters which have caused the most criticism are those
which anppar to have no apparent substantial empirical base. Only recently
has a significant effort been made by analysts and historians to document
past combat engagements in order to determine the value of such parameters
as casualty rates, replacement rates, kill probabilities, and advance
rates. Of course, one may question the validity of relying on past data
to model further conflicts. However, the objective of the entire war
gaming effort is to gain insights into the complexities of war and make better
estimates of future requirements. Combat modeling provides a mechanism for
systematic and comprehensive conjecture about future contingencies. As the
FOREWON system is refined and updated with the improvement of gaming
techniques, its output, expressed in the model as F, becomes more meaningful
in force planning. This would affect the decision model by increasing the
value of <X , the FOREWON weighting coefficient.
41

In this effort to improve FOREWON, the war gaming aspect of the
system has been the center of the research effort. The research task of
developing a combat simulator that would incorporate certain features
which have caused the criticism of ATLAS concentrates on two areas. First,
the elimination of the dependence of battle outcomes on force ratios derived
from comparisons of friendly and opposed firepower scores is considered
important. Second, the evaluations of theater battle at several echelons
from corps down through brigades is another feature sought. RAC's Theater
Combat Model (TCM) attemots to resolve some of the deficiencies of ATLAS
and may be the next generation war game for FOREWON.
The other term in the decision model is d[PS,CR,MJ,JP], expressed in
units of DFEs. Its associated weighting coefficient, 8 , relates the
proportionally of the ASOP estimate that can be attributed to non-FOREWGN
factors. This function is comprised of four major, indentifiable variables:
past studies (PS); theater CinC's requests (CR); military judgment as seen
in staff analysis (MJ); and joint OSD/Army planning estimates. Although
each variable in itself produces some level of force estimate which can
be exnressed in DFE units, the scope and parameters of the estimates are
not identical
.
For example, a past Army study, PS, might be referenced in order
to determine a troop estimate for a specific country given a certain set
of political conditions, while the CinC, United States Forces in Europe
might estimate his requirements for the European theater under a different
set of conditions. It is the responsibility of DCSOPS force planners to
combine the various inputs and references to subjectively determine the
value of d[PS,CR,MJ,JP]. It might be as easy as referring to D[T-1] to
arrive at D(T) however the political and military situations seldom remain
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stable or predictable enough to allow such an uncomplicated solution to
the planninq problem.
Another component of d[PS,CR,MJ,JP] is military judgment. Although
it can be said that military judgment appears in all of the planning
sources, in the model it appears exclusively in the form of command guidance,
staff actions, and individual assessment of the varied inputs to the
estimation process. The planning staff in 0DC50PS continually adjusts
their estimates in response to new guidance from higher authorities. This
might appear in the form of budgetary constraints or a new technical
development which would affect the estimate for the ASOP's planning horizon.
Often, staff sections produce studies and reports based solely on the
military interpretation of certain actions which also could affect the
ASOP estimate. It is this set of informational inputs that are characterized
as
::
military judgment' 1 in the model's function, d[PS,CR,MJ,JP].
The remaining two terms in d[PS,CR,MJ,JP] that need explanation are
CR and JP. CR stands for the theater CinC's request for specific troop
levels based on their own threat analysis and knowledge of their theater's
operations. These estimates from the respective CinCs constitute a some-
what biased view of the needs of each theater however the estimates contain
many valid planning considerations. The CinCs are obviously closer to
the problem than the planners located in the Pentagon. The CinCs can
offer first hand judgments on the preparedness of Allied units and their
potential to accomplish assigned combat tasks.
Another easily referenced input in the model is JP, or joint planning
estimates by OSD/Army planning efforts. Not all the force planning in
the Pentaaon is conducted in the isolation of the separate departments or
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services. Joint OSD/Army studies are prepared in the force planning
field. The scope of these studies is not as extensive as the ASOP
estimate however. Recently, many of these efforts have concentrated
on the force level problems in Southeast Asia. Regardless of the scope
of the joint effort, it takes an important role in the ASOP estimation
effort because it represents a convergence of ARMY and OSD approaches to
the force planning problem.
The function, d[PS,CR,MJ,JP], may take on various forms in the
yearly ASOP estimates. It might be that the term CR assumes greater
importance for a particular yearly estimate. Whatever the functional
form that the term takes on, it merely reflects the emphasis placed on
the non-FOREWON planning estimates. Rarely can the exact form be deter-
mined because of the flexible nature of the planning process and the
-.. J ,.;?K-i "l -: : w rtf nnn-FORFUnN input*
In the economic-political atmosphere that prevails in the deter-
mination of military strategy and posture, several alternative lower levels
2
of forces below the "worst case" 'must be analyzed. The ASOP planners must
choose a level below the "worst case" requirements which satisfy fiscal
and military constraints and also demonstrate acceptability by the Army,
JCS, and OSD planners. A tradeoff of acceptance of the ASOP estimate for
the increased probability of failure to accomplish the Army's objectives
is attempted in the consideration of lower, less conservative force levels.
The impact of the resultant "tradeoff" force must be closely analyzed by
ASOP planners who must evaluate the strategic "adequacy" of projected
forces.
2"Worst case" refers to the most pessimistic view ^ friendly
capabilities and optimistic view of enemy capabilities.
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Now that the decision model has been discussed, there are tv/o
important factors of force planning that the model must handle and




2. Risk in the effectiveness model
Scenario risk is defined here to be the chance of failing to accurately
describe the set of conditions which most likely would occur in a conflict
situation. That is, the scenario should clearly depict a combat situation
that might conceivably take place. Here, risk in the effectiveness model
is defined to be the probability that the values of the model's parameters
represent the most logical description of the activity they model. In this
context, the parameters of ATLAS should represent a set of feasible and
realistic parameter values. If they do not, there is an associated risk
in accepting the results of ATI AS. Firepower scores are an example of
parameters which should adequately describe an activity, in this case, the
fire ootential of a combat unit.
The treatment of scenario development in the ASOP planning environ-
ment has caused much debate among other planning agencies, such as OASD(SA)
Some of the concern has been centered on the scenarios' apparent inability
to describe a foreseeable combat situation. One reason for this concern
is the diverse opinions on how to interpret strategic guidance. Army
planners attempt to translate strategic guidance into hypothetical combat.
The development of scenarios from the guidance entails a process of trans-
lating broad concepts, such as attack or defend, into time and space
situations. Scenarios depict the combat situation together with its
associated rates of advance, casualty rates, deployment schedules, and
other combat parameters. The problem which occurs frequently in force
planning is that combat requirements to which the fighting capabilities
are addressed are usually the "worst case' situation.
45

The "worst case" situation involves the highest conceivable threat,
the shortest preoaredness times, and the most pessimistic evaluation of
the capabilities of friendly forces, and optimistic evaluation of enemy
forces. This does not imply that determining requirements against the
"worst case" is improper for force planning. This approach, as should
be noted by all personnel reviewing the requirements, produces estimates
that are very conservative and generally the upper bound on required force
levels.
Scenario risk can be quantified by manipulating the variables in
the given scenario. Examples of these variables are mobilization times,
warning times, available support from Allied nations, and advance rates of
attacking forces. Each of these variables can be expressed in units of
time, numbers of troops , or amounts of land seized. When the mobilization
times of friendly reserve units are lengthened, there is a degree of
scenario risk which is associated with the resultant change. The scenario
might now represent an unrealistic situation and produce requirements that
greatly exceed even pessimistic combat demands. The Army planners must
shomhow present their estimates for requirements with a clear description
of their interpretation of scenario risk with each specific estimate.
Risk in the effectiveness model must be considered when considering
the utility of the model. There are numerous risk considerations that
could effect the model. One of these considerations is the availability
of acceptable values for combat activities. Good empirical values are
not always available for certain parameters of combat. The dynamic
effects of warfare have not been adequately described in the current state
of the art to permit anything but a "best guess" approach to assigning
certain combat values. These "best guess" values affec the credibility
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of the model and hence decrease the probability (increase the risk)
that the model realistically represents the situation. For example,
force ratios as determined by firepower scores represent a "best guess"
toward the problem of assigning a unit some measure of combat potential.
Another risk consideration for the effectiveness model is the
divergence of "verified" parameter values. This divergence, or spread,
represents a range of values which, depending upon the situation, can be
supported by an examination of operational or test data. As was mentioned
in the "worst case" discussion, there is a corresponding confidence asso-
ciated with these values as they vary between their upper and lower bounds.
By assigning values in the extremes of the acceptability spread, the
planner can provide a hedge against possible shortcomings in analysis.
That is, the planner who uses low values for friendly activities and
correspondingly high values for enemy activities produces extremely con-
servative estimates of what interactions occur.
Another consideration inherent in examining the effectiveness model
is the opportunity to alter parameter values to produce desired results.
Similar to the treatment of scenario risk, the model can be a function
of manipulation of parameter values. In large scale simulations of
combat, the "black box" approach can hide many of the "massaged" values
of the complicated model. This does not imply that force planners
purposely alter values in the models to achieve a set of objectives. The
confidence expressed in results from the model should reflect the possi-
bility that such a procedure could occur however.
Up to this point, the treatment of risk has dealt primarily with
the assignment of parameter values. There is another important considera-
tion of risk that should be noted. Risk in the effecti sness model is
a function of the attitude of those examining it. It is a difficult
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task to distinguish between a planners desires to conservatively model
a situation and a concerted effort to produce a desired results. This
problem of distinguishing the intent of planners in their estimation
effort is strongly related to their attitude toward risk. Attitude
toward risk can be associated with the confidence that is expressed in
the model's ability to produce desired results. For example, military
planners who view force estimation with the outlook of possibly operating
in combat with that force prefer low risk and high confidence in the
models utilized. A civilian planner, as a non-combatant, might tradeoff
the risk in accomplishing the combat mission for a reduced expenditure
of resources. Throughout the force planning process, the risk in accepting
model's results is varied accordingly to the viewer's attitude toward risk.
For Army planners, a thorough understanding of the objectives and
limitations of dynamic models used to represent the real situation is
essential. Strict reliance on ATLAS results without some appreciation
of the problems of the war gaming tends to produce estimates that lack
credibility. On the other hand, OASD(SA) planners who rely on static
indicators in order to estimate requirements for dynamic situations should
also understand the limitations and implications of their approach. It
should be noted here that planners from OSD have demonstrated more interest
in the utility of the dynamic approach. Perhaps the future will bring a
merger of the two methodologies and a corresponding understanding of the
different levels of force planning problems.
In summary of this section, the decision model can be seen to describe
a process within ODCSOPS that annually presents an ASOP estimate for the
PPBS cycle. Along with the functional relationships that were examined,
a review of two key factors in force planning, scenario risk and risk in
48

the effectiveness model, were discussed as they apply to the decision




VI. EXAMINING THE VALIDITY OF THE MODEL
In this section the validity of both the decision model and the
model's inputs are discussed. There is a significant difference between
evaluatinq the model's validity and evaluating the information on which
the model is based. The model's validity is defined to the the ability of
the model's functional relationshios to portray the actual decision process.
However, the inputs' validity refers to the accuracy and applicability o?
the information which is used by the decision model. The purpose of this
section is to view both aspects of validity and then suggest possible
research areas which might answer the questions proposed by the examination.
A. VALIDITY OF THE MODEL'S EQUATIONS
The decision model's equations attempt to show the relationship of
FOREWON results to non-FOREWON results in the ASOP estimate planning effort
in ODCSOPS. The Army's ultimate decision as to how many Army divisions
to ask for in the ASOP might not be a function of DCSOPS ASOP estimate
alone. In this discussion however, the unquantifiable influences outside
the planning environment of ODCSOPS are not considered, however, they
possibly could affect the validity of the estimate. The problem then
becomes one of comparing the model's results with past ODCSOPS estimates.
Since the model describes the process which produces the ASOP, one
method of testing the validity of the model is to examine past products
of DCSOPS 's planning efforts and compare the ASOP estimate to the
functional form of the model. That is, reconstruct the past derisions in
terms of the model's variables and establish the patterns of the decision
process. For example, this procedure might indicate an increasing reliance
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on FOREWON results which could be observed in increasing values of the
FOREWON weighting coefficient.
Unquantifiable planning factors, such as morale, and command in-
fluence, have been mentioned earlier in this discussion. It is possible
that these factors exert a strong influence on the ASOP estimate. Although
it would be easy to describe such influences by the addition of a "catch-all"
or miscellaneous function, it would not aid in the analysis of how the
decision process works. The purpose of the decision model is not solely
to provide logical consistency in the explanation of the process, but
rather to allow insights to be drawn from the descriptive portrayal of
ODCSOPS's ASOP process.
There should be some method of quantifying each of the variables
in the model's equation if they are to be analyzed. The results of FOREWON
runs are easily referenced since they provide their own computer printouts.
The other variables which vere introduced (PS,CR,MJ ,JP) are not as easily-
quantified, although the task is not impossible. Past studies, PS, are
usually referenced in the consideration of a particular area or situation and,
as such, their contributions in the ASOP estimate could be identified. The
CinCs requests also appear in written form and explain in detail the CinCs'
estimate of the situation in their theaters and the necessary resources
needed to accomplish the mission. Military judgment, M.J, is perhaps the
most difficult variable to quantify. A force planner could conceivably
assemble the estimates of the other variables on his desk when preparing
the ASOP estimate, however, military judgment and interpretation, appears
in some form in every planning variable. As such, it is difficult to
separate and affix a value for its contribution in ASOP. On the other
hand, military judgment also appears in the form of staff studies and
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command guidance. Quantification of military judgment, although difficult,
is considered necessary to demonstrate its impact on the estimation process
of ODCSOPS. Joint planning efforts, JP, are another easily referenced
and quantified variable since the results of these efforts are usually
documented in some form of force units, which again could be converted
to DFEs.
The major problem is not quantifying the variables but determining
what impact each has on the structure of the model's formula. This
difficulty in identifying the formula's structure might be overcome by
utilizing a reporting system on each submission of the ASOP. It would
list the sources that were used for the estimate and a description of
their contribution in the process. Since many personnel prepare the
estimate, knowing how the ASOP estimate "fits together" from the numerous
sources would assist ODCSOPS in analyzing how and where its planning
effort is directed. This "effort-evaluation" procedure was mentioned
previously in the introduction.
Once the relationships of the model's variables are known, it
is desirable to extend this knowledge of the relationships to gain useful
insights. Utilizing statistical methods, such as regression analysis
and analysis of variance, the model can be examined with the variables
quantified as discussed above. To illustrate how the model might be
analyzed, a generalized example is presented which is limited due to
the complexity of the process.
This example assumes a linear form of the decision model. It is
then possible to examine the values of the DCSOPS estimate when compared
to the estimate of the FOREVJON system. This procedure is appropriate
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because each of these variables are easily quantified for any given
ASOP. The structure of the form would then be:





DCSOPS estimate for year T
regression coefficient
FOREWON estimate
intercept term (non-FOREWON influences)
When viewed as shewn above, © 2 represents the impact of non-FOREWON
estimates on the decision. It may be determined by a regression analysis
in which each variable in the linear form of the model or the above model
is examined to provide an estimate of the impact of non-FOREWON infiusnees.
Assuming that the value of Go aives a close approximation to the average
impact of non-FOREWON influences, it would be beneficial to look at the
variance of the D(T). There is a certain amount of variance normally
associated with D(T), expressed Var(9-|F +60). Any unexplained variance
observed in the analysis of D(T) can consequently be attributed to the
non-FOREWON influences on D(T) since the FOREWON estimates, F, are krown
from year to year. By observing these variances over a successive number
of ASOP cycles, trends might be recognized for the influence of FOREWON
and non-FOREWON estimates on D(T).
However, it should be noted that the above techniques for looking
at D(T) also has certain difficulties. Because of the frequent uncertainty
about basic variables and mechanisms of the ASOP process, caution should
be exercised in analyzing the model's results. Just because a particular
functional relationship has been assumed and a speci* c computational
procedure- followed, it is dangerous to infer that a change in one variable
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causes a change in another variable. L 1 2j y(ie statistical analysis is
only a tool to aid in the interpretation of data and not a foolproof
indicator of how the model operates in the changing environment of the
Army's ASOP decision.
B. VALIDITY OF THE MODEL'S INPUTS
Even if the decision model accurately depicted the actual estimation
process, the results of the model could be discredited because of invalid
inputs which the model might utilize. The examination of the inputs'
validity is centered upon a review of ATLAS. There are a number of
reasons for this approach. First, ATLAS is the backbone of the FOREWON
structure since it provides the determination of the effectiveness of
combat forces in the theater environment. Another reason to review the
FOREWON' s validity, in particular ATLAS, is that the non- FOREWON inputs
are not easily analyzed since they cannot be presented in a standard
form from one ASOP to the next. Until the contributions of each variable
in the function, d[PS,CR,MJ,JP], can be identified, their validity in
the final form of the ASOP estimate is impossible to evaluate. For
these reasons, the examination of the inputs validity will be limited
to looking at ATLAS.
There are many and varied parameters in ATLAS which could be
analyzed to determine if they had an empirical or scientific basis.
These parameters are considered here in conventional warfare not in
nuclear environment. Of the numerous parameters, those most often
criticized are firepower calculations, casualty and replacements rates,
advance rates, and measurements of terrain, posture and maneuver. These
parameters are discussed in the light of influencing the validity of ATLAS,
the FOREWON system, and hence the proposed decision model.
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1 . Measuring Firepower
The firepower of a land combat force is usually considered
to consist of commonly available and employed individual and crew-served
weapons such as rifles, machine guns, mortars, howitzers, and recoil less
rifles, tank guns, anti-tank guns, and some missiles and rockets. Ideally,
a system for measuring firepower would result in each weapon being assigned
a number representing that weapon's value in combat relative to all the
other weapons used. Unfortunately the value of a weapon depends upon the
circumstances of use. Most firepower measurement systems aggregate the
"balanced" potential of a battalion or larger unit. The aggregation of
firepower potential entails a procedure of totaling the casualty-producing
effects of each weapon and determining some measure of that potential.
The most commonly used measure is called the "lethal area."
T!,£ lethal area of a projectile is derived by an analysis of the
number, shape, velocity, and distribution of the fragments from that
projectile. Experimentally derived knowledge of the effect such fragments
could have on human flesh and bones is readily available. Although the
measure includes all of the known characteristics of the projectile, the
uncontrollable variables associated with the explosion of a shell tend to
detract from the preciseness of the measure.. The inherent differences
from shell to shell in such characteristics as metal-grain structure,
wall thickness, powder distribution and burning rate are a few of the
uncontrollable variables. Terrain, weather, detonation angle and target
posture can also be added to the list of factors which made "lethal area"
an inprecise measure of casualty-producing potential. ATLAS uses an




Research Analysis Corporation (RAC) considered one firepower score
per weapon to be sufficient for their use. The Combat Development Command
(CDC) used different lethal areas and ammunition consumption rates to
derive a set of eleven firepower potentials for each weapon. The varia-
tions are intended to reflect different usages and combat postures against
different targets. The problem of assigning lethal potential for area-type
or point-type weapon systems is further complicated by determining what
type of target will be displayed for each system and the degree the target
has "hardened" itself against various weapon systems. A man in a hardened
posture, for instance a foxhole, cannot be hit by a point- type weapon
fired from the same level, however area weapons such as artillery using
certain fusina devices might have a potential to injure or kill the soldier
in the foxhole.
Any weapon system has zero potential without someone to operate it
and the deqree of proficiency of system operators could invalidate any
preconceived measurement of firepower potential or a system of firepower
scores. This variability in crew proficiency or system usage could com-
pletely invalidate "average" results utilized in simulated land combat
actions.
2. Casualties and Replacements
The discussion of casualties and replacements will be directed
toward determining how casualties are produced in simulated war games, and
in ATLAS, and then describing the procedure used to replace these casualties
during the simulated combat in ATLAS. Since the ability of forces to con-
duct warfare is in someway related to the production of casualties on enemy
units, the capability to degrade the enemy war fighting bility should be
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viewed as part of a unit's combat effectiveness. Historical evidence is
inconclusive on how closely casualties are associated with combat
effectiveness.
One war gaming manual by RAC stated:
"The reduction in combat effectiveness is not directly
proportional to the percentage of casualties. A small
percentage of casualties in a fresh, full -TOE unit has,
on the average, a negligible effect. A small additional
percentage tends quickly to affect the unit's effectiveness. " [8]
Casualties play an important part in ATLAS because they determine
how the battle is progressing. The combat capabilities of the opposing
forces, as expressed by ICE, degrade the force levels of the units propor-
tionately to the respective ICE. In ATLAS casualties are also used to
determine the defender's posture when it is not a prepared defense. This
is done by assuming that as casualties increase and unit effectiveness
decrsases , the unit's ability to resist also decreases. Examples of this
decrease are observed in the combat postures degenerating from a meeting
engagement, to a delaying action, from that to an organized withdrawal, and
finally a disorganized retreat. ATLAS does not have a "prisoner of war"
capability nor can it account for units beina "wiped out."
In summary, the simulation of casualties in a theater lovel war
game like ATLAS provides a method for modifying the assumed basic combat
capability of the affected unit. However, the credibility of the modi-
fications rests largely on opinion and belief. Historical records of
battles are deficient in quantified and verifiable data and cannot be
used to either prove or disprove the assumptions used in war games on
casualties.
Regardless of how casualties are produced, ATLAS has a replacement
policy to handle this combat function. Initially ATLAS was designed with
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a constant percentage of a unit's TOE strength to be used as a replacement
rate. With this constant rate policy, individual replacements began
entering the battle area on the first day and continued at this constant
rate. The linear replacement policy proved to be too inflexible and did
not correspond to the actual situation. A non-linear policy was adopted
which allowed the replacements to be kept at zero until a specified day,
D,
.
The form of this replacement curve is as shown in Figure 3.




the maximum rate is in effect. The important result of this
policy is that it accounts for units that must continue understrength
in the early stages of war when replacements might not be available. A
critical assumption which is made in ATLAS however with this non-linear
policy is that what is needed is provided. LIOJ This may not be the case
in actual combat due Lu interdiction of the LOC or other combcil activities
Although the non-linear curve appears more realistic, only actual data
could support such assumptions and the data is not available.
3. Advance Rate and Associated Factors
Fundamental to the operations in ATLAS is the treatment of the
rate of advance of an attacking unit. The speed at which a unit can
advance is a function of many variables, some of which may be described
explicitly, or, as in ATLAS, handled implicitly. The decision rules which
govern the movement of highly aggregated forces have been based on historical
data and have generally been accepted by most war gaming authorities. L8 J
The problem concerning advance rates is that war games, ATLAS in particular,
allow continued advance by the attaching force, day after day. This problem
has been handled in ATLAS by the introduction of a "hold"' g" posture.
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Rate of replacements (%)
xmax
D-Day *zz days
Figure 3: Non-Linear Replacement Curve
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The holding posture used arbitrarily when an attack against an
enemy in a hasty, prepared, or fortified position has gone on long enough
for the attacked to have sustained approximately 10% casualties, a figure
that appears to have no empirical basis. However, even with this holding
posture, ATLAS might have represented a rate of combat activity that could
not be sustained in actual operations due to logistical limitations,
human capabilities to sustain such rates, and a change in enemy strategy
to counter such a high rate of combat activity. Other factors which
affect the attacker's ability to advance are force ratio and the degree
of resistence offered by the defender. Force ratios have been discussed
in the treatment of firepower measurements. Low force ratios imply both
forces about equal and hence a stalemate while higher levels implies the
ability of one force to attack against a weaker combat posture, Maneuver,
which is recognized as one of the principles of warfare, is not usually
simulated in theater level war games, such as ATLAS. A detailed game in
a less aggregated form which can be made more dependent upon the opinions
and judgments of the players and controllers, would include the possibility
of increasing a unit's combat power temporarily to account for some pre-
sumed advantage of surprise or maneuver.
There are other factors affecting the outcome of battles that
designers are unable to build into their aggregated models with any
quantitative basis and thus adding a measure of validity to the models.
The most commonly referenced factors are traininn or readiness, morale,
and esprite de corps. The ability to communicate is also a difficult
quality to assess, since there is no available data to confirm that the
side with more radios is better off. In fact, many argue that after some
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unknown level of communication is reached, the addition of more communi-
cations is detrimental to combat effectiveness.
It is important to note these specific areas previously discussed
affect the validity of ATLAS, hence the entire decision model. The
model does not have predictive qualities. Its purpose is to portray
what has transpired in ODCSOPS ASOP planning. The validity of the model
was discussed in two areas - the author's design and the inputs to that
design. A flaw in either would result in an invalid and meaningless
model. However, it should be understood that the model was designed
without regard for its predictive value but rather for its usefulness
as an indicator of past trends and procedures in the force estimating
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